Conflict Resilience by HALKIA STAMATIA et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
Conflict Resilience 
 
 
 
 
 
HALKIA Matina, THOMAKOS Dimitrios, FERRI 
Stefano, PAPAZOGLOU Michail, VAN DAMME 
Marie-Sophie 
2020 
EUR 30035 EN 
  
This publication is a Technical report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science and knowledge service. It 
aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a 
policy position of the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is 
responsible for the use that might be made of this publication. For information on the methodology and quality underlying the data used 
in this publication for which the source is neither Eurostat nor other Commission services, users should contact the referenced source. The 
designations employed and the presentation of material on the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part 
of the European Union concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation 
of its frontiers or boundaries. 
 
Contact information  
Name: Matina HALKIA 
Address: Joint Research Centre, via Enrico fermi 2749, TP267, 21027 ISPRA (VA), Italy 
Email: matina.halkia@ec.europa.eu 
Tel.: +39 0332786242 
 
EU Science Hub 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc 
 
 
JRC119383 
 
EUR 30035 EN 
 
PDF ISBN 978-92-76-14655-1 ISSN 1831-9424 doi:10.2760/152500 
 
 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020 
 
© European Union, 2020 
 
The reuse policy of the European Commission is implemented by the Commission Decision 2011/833/EU of 12 December 2011 on the 
reuse of Commission documents (OJ L 330, 14.12.2011, p. 39). Except otherwise noted, the reuse of this document is authorised under 
the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This means that 
reuse is allowed provided appropriate credit is given and any changes are indicated. For any use or reproduction of photos or other 
material that is not owned by the EU, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders. 
 
 
All images © European Union 2020 
 
How to cite this report: Halkia, S., Thomakos, D., Ferri, S., Papazoglou, M. and Van Damme, M., Conflict Resilience, EUR 30035 EN, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020, ISBN 978-92-76-14655-1 (online), doi:10.2760/152500 (online), 
JRC119383. 
 
 i 
Contents 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 
2 Conflict resilience ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 
3 Data-driven approaches for detecting resilience to conflicts ....................................................................................................... 7 
3.1 Repression and intra-state conflict risk ........................................................................................................................................... 7 
3.2 Pre-conflict resilience.................................................................................................................................................................................. 8 
3.3 Post-conflict resilience ............................................................................................................................................................................ 10 
4 Climate change and conflict ............................................................................................................................................................................ 11 
5 Conclusions................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 13 
References .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Authors 
 
HALKIA Matina1, THOMAKOS Dimitrios2, FERRI Stefano1, PAPAZOGLOU Michail3, VAN DAMME Marie-Sophie4 
                                           
1 European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Ispra, Italy   
2 Unisystems S.A, Rue Edward Steichen 26, Luxembourg, LU L-2540 
3 Unisystems S.A, Via Michelangelo Buonarroti 39, 20145 Milano, Italy 
4 Piksel Ltd Italian Branch, Via Breda 176, Milano (MI), Italy   
  
Abstract 
Although large-scale wars and interstate conflicts have almost disappeared, intrastate conflicts remain 
widespread and result in a high number of victims. During the last ten years, the number of fatalities was 
substantially higher than in the previous decade.  
Though these conflicts take place outside the borders of the EU, they can generate important direct and indirect 
effects. Moreover, they are connected to climate change, can lead to various disasters, geopolitical effects, or 
material supply disruptions. 
The concept of resilience has recently gained ground as a framework for addressing contemporary global 
threats. It has also become the key principle in the EU’s external action. One of its key building blocks is the 
modelling and monitoring of conflict risk to allow early action.  
Conflict resilience refers to the capacity of a state to resist a drift towards violence contrary to the structural 
conditions prevailing (pre-conflict resilience). It also includes the response of a state in the presence of a conflict 
(post-conflict resilience).   
Evaluating the pre-conflict resilience of states can provide insights into conflict aversion or enable a warning 
for the eruption of violence. On the other hand, the study of postconflict resilience may unveil the adaptive and 
transformative mechanisms that can be followed by other war-torn countries.   
Climate change and conflicts are closely related. For example, climate change exacerbates current conflict 
drivers like food insecurity, competition for water and land resources, poverty and internal displacement of 
people. Adaptation and mitigation policies may lead to new regulations or infrastructures (like new hydropower 
reservoirs) which can generate tensions and eventually conflicts. Finally, conflict-torn countries are unable to 
invest in adaptation strategies, which makes them even more vulnerable to climate change effects.  
  
1 Introduction 
Although the large-scale wars of the first half of the 20th century remain a distant memory particularly for the 
Western World and interstate conflicts have almost disappeared, intrastate conflicts remain widespread, 
resulting in a high number of victims. The last decades witnessed three genocides, one of them in one of the 
most developed countries of Eastern Europe (Yugoslavia).  
During the last ten years, the number of fatalities was substantially higher compared to the previous decade, 
despite the undergoing de-escalation of the Syrian War (Figure 1). Non-state actors are also increasingly 
resorting to violence in order to resolve their disputes. 
 
Figure 1: Fatalities in organized violence by type, 1989-2017. Source: Pettersson and Eck (2018). 
 
According to the 2019 Global Risks Report of the World Economic Forum, the adverse scenarios of large-scale 
involuntary migration, failure of national governance, profound social instability and water crises are very 
probable in the future. These global risks have been identified as potential conflict drivers. Furthermore, extreme 
weather events, failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation and natural disasters are at the top of the 
risk list in terms of likelihood (Figure 2). As it will be discussed in more details later in the chapter, although 
there is no evidence that the consequences of climate change can be the sole cause of a conflict, they may 
have significant security implications under the presence of certain socioeconomic conditions. Therefore, the 
risk of violent conflicts may increase significantly in the years to come. 
All these developments and trends confirm the need for conflict risk modelling. Optimizing early warning 
systems will enable the European Union, EU Member States, and the international community in general to 
become more proactive. Apart from exploring the drivers of conflict and assessing conflict risk, it is also vital to 
investigate the resilience capacity of states and local communities that enables them to endure shocks, to avert 
the eruption of violence and to facilitate the peaceful resolution of disputes.  
The concept of resilience has recently been incorporated into the discourse of peace and conflict studies. 
Consequently, the international community and peace organizations emphasize fostering the resilience of the 
  
local social institutions of the conflict-torn countries in order to “sustain their own peace processes"5. For 
instance, Interpeace6 in collaboration with other actors has developed its own framework that uncovers “the 
endogenous assets, attributes, qualities, resources and actions embedded within communities and societies 
which can potentially serve to protect them from violent conflict”7. UNESCO promotes a culture of peace and 
non-violence through education and other activities. Other organizations focus on sustainable development, 
institution building and other areas that reduce the risks of conflict eruption and violence. 
 
Figure 2: The Global Risks Landscape 2019. Source: World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2019. 
 
Resilience has also been recognised as the key principle in the EU’s external action. The Joint Communication 
on “A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action”8 argues for the “need to move from crisis 
containment to a more structural, long-term approach to vulnerabilities, with an emphasis on anticipation, 
prevention and preparedness”. One of its key building blocks is the modelling and monitoring of external 
pressures to allow early action. 
                                           
5  de Coning (2018), page 304. 
6  Interpeace is an international organization established in 1994 by the UN to develop solutions to build peace. 
https://www.interpeace.org/ 
7  Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, CEPAD and the Platform for Dialogue and Peace (2016), page 11. 
8  High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council: A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external action. Brussels, 7.6.2017. [Available online at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/joint_communication_-
a_strategic_approach_to_resilience_in_the_eus_external_action-2017.pdf] 
  
2 Conflict resilience 
 
Resilience looks at the evolution of society around shocks. In the conflict context, it can refer to the dynamics 
of conflict eruption or avoidance (pre-conflict resilience), or a country’s response to the eruption of conflict 
(post-conflict resilience). 
The emergence of internal conflict and violence has been associated with factors such as the lack of democracy, 
weak institutions, economic inequality, repression of minorities, poverty or a background of political violence 
among others. During a period of peace, the deterioration of these structural conditions usually leads to the 
eruption of conflicts. For instance, the rise of poverty due to an economic crisis or the breakout of a civil war at 
a neighbouring country may trigger a conflict in the short or long term.  
However, there are countries that resist a drift towards violence, because of their endogenous characteristics 
(e.g. political tradition, social cohesion, value systems, cultural practices, strong civil society, etc.), foreign policy 
orientation or other parameters (e.g. policies or actions of political elites). These countries exhibit high pre-
conflict resilience. Evaluating the pre-conflict resilience of states is of great importance as this could provide 
insights into conflict prevention mechanisms or, in the opposite case, give a warning to the eruption of civil 
wars, mass political violence, even genocides. 
Conflict prediction and prevention are not always feasible, given the limitations of ‘early warning’ systems and 
considering the endemic nature of conflicts, such as those in Africa. Thus, there is a growing interest in the 
international community on a country’s capacity to respond to the eruption of conflict and violence. This can be 
labelled as post-conflict resilience. Assessing the positive or negative structural response during a post-conflict 
time period can give valuable insights into their adaptive or transformative mechanisms. For example, as Fortna 
and Huang (2012) was phrasing, “some states emerging from internal conflict take significant strides toward 
democracy, while others do not”.  
 
  
3 Data-driven approaches for detecting resilience to conflicts 
 
3.1 Repression and intra-state conflict risk 
 
The Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI, developed by the JRC9) is an important starting point for measuring 
resilience. It reports the risk of violent conflicts in the next one to four years, using quantitative indicators from 
open sources. Based  on this index, a recent JRC study (Halkia et al, 2017) has investigated the relationship 
between repression and conflict intensity, since the former has been associated in the literature with the onset 
of civil wars (Regan and Norton, 2005), (Young, 2013). The analysis found that the two variables are indeed 
highly correlated. Most countries demonstrate resilience up to a certain level of repression, after which conflict 
intensity grows steadily at increased levels of repression.   
The degree of correlation differs among countries (Figure 3). For the majority of countries, repression is 
positively correlated with conflict intensity, while there are few outlier cases, where increased repression is 
associated with lower conflict intensity (negative correlation) or there is zero correlation.  
The results of the analysis also demonstrate that high levels of repression – a typical feature of dictatorships 
and authoritarian regimes – are associated with high risk of a conflict. Strengthening democratic institutions 
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms should, therefore, lie at the heart of a coherent policy 
framework on conflict prevention. 
 
Figure 3: Correlation between conflict intensity and repression. Source: JRC calculations based on Halkia et al. 
(2017). 
 
                                                           
 
                                           
9   See De Groeve et al. (2014) for the initial description of the GCRI. https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/peace-
andstability/projects/gcri and https://science4peace.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ (access needs to be requested) 
  
3.2 Pre-conflict resilience 
 
The risk classification of countries by the GCRI can also be utilised to analyse pre-conflict resilience. As a starting 
point, Figure 4 illustrates the conflict proneness of the countries in 2018 using four different risk classifications: 
low, moderate-low, moderate-high and high.  
 
Figure 4: GCRI results for 2018. Source: JRC. 
 
 
 
Pre-conflict resilience is then assessed by comparing the risk classification with the country’s conflict record. 
Countries in the low (or moderate low) risk classification, where a conflict was eventually recorded within a four 
years time frame, are considered as of low resilience. On the other hand, high resilient countries are those that 
although were classified at ‘high’ or ‘moderate-high’ risk categories, a conflict did not finally erupt.   
The most interesting case of low resilient countries proved to be Tunisia and Egypt, before the outbreak of the 
Arab Spring events. Both countries were classified as low-risk during the four years before the events, but 
eventually, both countries suffered from violent conflicts.  
One indicative high resilient case is Burkina Faso. The country is almost constantly under fragile conditions. This 
is reflected in the GCRI, where almost all indices relating to the economy (GDP per capita, economic openness, 
food security), and in addition many other security-related, social and geographical variables get very high 
values. Consequently, the GCRI estimated a moderate-high risk of violent conflict during the entire period since 
1989 (Figure 5). Nevertheless, Burkina Faso, demonstrating a remarkable resilience to conflicts, has never 
descended into violence. To understand the determinants of such resilience is an important area of ongoing 
research.  
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4: Burkina Faso National Power Conflict Risk. Orange indicates a moderate-high risk of conflict.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3.3 Post-conflict resilience  
 
As it was discussed earlier, resilience has a strong temporal component, and also refers to a country’s response 
to the eruption of conflict. In this case, one has to examine the structural response during the post-conflict time 
period. Taking into account that variables such as corruption, infant mortality, water stress or the demographic 
structure cannot change in the short term, the analysis should be focused on those ones that do change and 
usually have an impact on the country’s future course. The variables from the GCRI model proposed here are 
the normalized values of GDP, regime type and economic openness. Figure 5 shows the evolution of such 
variables following the conflict events that took place in the context of the Arab Spring in Tunisia (2010-11). 
 
Figure 5: Key indicators in Tunisia after the Arab Spring. Source: JRC calculations using the GCRI. 
Note: Each variable is normalized into a scale of 1-10, with higher values representing worse outcomes (less 
economic openness, for example). 
 
 
 
The graph shows that Tunisia recovered very fast regarding its economic openness in the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring events, attracting significant foreign direct investment inflows. However, this positive trend was not 
maintained in the long term. On the other hand, the country emerged from internal conflict taking significant 
strides towards democracy, demonstrating a remarkable transformative capacity. The GDP per capita remained 
stable, as the economy was not significantly affected by the events nor any significant structural change took 
place. 
 
 
  
4 Climate change and conflict  
 
Although the direct causal link between climate change and conflict is debated, conflict experts have identified 
pathways linking the adverse effects of climate change with the eruption of violence through a myriad of socio-
economic drivers. 
 
A first potential pathway is the aggravation of current conflict drivers by climate change. For example, food 
insecurity, competition for water and land resources, poverty and internal displacement of people are some of 
the current conflict drivers that climate change exacerbates. According to Fetzek and Mazo (2014), at least 40% 
of intra-state conflicts since the end of the Second World War were related to disputes over natural resources. 
Gleick (2014) and Kelley et al. (2015) have asserted that the severe drought of 2007-2010 contributed to the 
recent devastating Syrian Conflict by aggravating the socioeconomic stresses in the country10. Farmer-herder 
conflicts that have been recorded in Africa on many instances may also be multiplied, taking into account the 
desertification trends combined with agricultural expansion into pastoral zones. The Darfur conflict is described 
by Jeffrey Mazo as essentially “a climate change conflict.” He emphasizes the land scarcity dimension of the 
dispute and the latent herder and farmer societal cleavage11. The latter view was largely espoused by the UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as well12. 
 
In the same context, a local income shock due to exposure to climate variability can trigger a violent conflict in 
the presence of other intervening variables such as dependence from agricultural income, ethnic segregation 
or increased political marginalization13.  
Other pathways to conflicts are related to scenarios that have not yet materialized. Examples include the 
flooding of coastal cities, the disappearance of entire islands due to the rise of sea level, competition over 
resources in polar regions or even the formation of new sovereign states (e.g. Greenland) due to the ice sheet 
decline, or the impacts of glaciers melting. Furthermore, adapting to or mitigating climate change can by itself 
contribute to the eruption of violent conflicts. For instance, banning fossil fuels exploitation in order to comply 
with new environmental regulations may produce grievances. Likewise, policies that intend to address the 
impact of climate change as it could be the development of renewable energy infrastructures such as 
hydropower dams or the increased mining of rare metals critical for batteries and electrical engines may 
potentially have conflict implications. A last and important link is the fact that war-torn countries are unable to 
invest in adaptation strategies, which makes them eventually even more vulnerable to climate change effects. 
The projected temperature increase for Africa and the Middle East (Figure 6) will aggravate the already fragile 
structural characteristics prevailing in this region, resulting most probably in the perpetuation of conflicts. 
Moreover, this violence will prohibit them to prepare and adapt for future climate change challenges.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
10  This view has been challenged by Selby et al. (2017). 
11  Mazo (2010), page 75. 
12  A climate culprit in Darfur." Washington Post, 16 June 2007. 
13  See Nina von Uexkull’s contribution in 4th Workshop on the EU Global Conflict Risk Index 2018, summarized 
in Halkia et al. (2018). 
  
Figure 6: Forecasted temperature increase and conflicts in Africa   
Source: Joint Research Centre (2017) Africa for the temperature change, and GCRI for the conflicts.  
Note: Projected change in the average mean summer temperature by the end of the century under a high 
warming climate scenario, and the 2018 GCRI conflict events and their intensity (on an increasing scale from 0 
to 10).  
 
 
 
In this context, the Global Conflict Risk Index has been recently extended to include a new variable that 
incorporates the effects of drought on agriculture-dependent regions. 
  
5 Conclusions 
 
Building resilience has prevailed as a new policy framework for addressing global threats including conflicts 
that remain the biggest threat for global security. Theorizing resilience is therefore essential for effectively 
utilizing this new concept in policymaking. JRC has identified a strong temporal component associated with the 
definition of resilience. Thus, resilience refers to the capacity of a state to resist a drift towards violence contrary 
to the structural conditions prevailing (pre-conflict resilience); and also to the response of a state in the presence 
of a conflict (post-conflict resilience). Evaluating the pre-conflict resilience of states can provide insights into 
conflict prevention or enable a warning for the eruption of violence. Likewise, evaluating the ability of a country 
to adapt and quickly recover from a conflict could serve as a policy paradigm guiding the external action of the 
European Union or the work of peacebuilding actors. Finally, climate change and intrastate conflict are closely 
related as there are pathways linking the adverse effects of this phenomenon with the eruption of violence.  
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